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This research examines the evaluation performed by the Navy International Programs
Office on United States Navy programs proposed as candidates for international
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program evaluations conducted by the International Programs Office during 1990-1991.
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cooperative efforts from World War II to the present, explores current issues, and examines
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On October 5, 1990, the Navy International Programs Office
(IPO) instituted a five- step evaluation method using a table
of 14 success criteria, grouped in three sections, to evaluate
Research and Development (R&D) programs proposed as candidates
for international codevelopment agreements between the U. S.
Government and allied nations. Before the development of the
success criteria, candidate programs were qualitatively
evaluated using a lengthy worksheet. With the introduction of
the success criteria, candidate programs were evaluated to
identify those programs with a low likelihood of success in
the international arena, and so direct the IPO's resources at
those candidate programs more likely to succeed.
The evaluation consisted of applying the 14 success
criteria twice to each candidate program, once to rate U. S.
participation in the program and once to rate allied
participation. Six strength ratings were then calculated, one
for each section of criteria for both the U. S. Government's
and the foreign participation. These paired ratings were
compared to each other; based on their "degree of
convergence," a weighted factor ranging from 0.5 to 1.5 was
then applied to each paired ratings. The three resultant
weighted rates were added to arrive at a final composite
strength rating for each candidate program. Eighteen
candidate programs were thus evaluated in the following
months; they were ranked in descending order according to
their composite strength ratings.
On July 30, 1991, IPO revised the success criteria,
dropping two items, substituting in for two others, and
regrouping the criteria into four sections vice three.
Generally, the five-step evaluation process remained
unchanged. The new procedure did call, however, for only a
single "strength matching" weight to be applied to the entire
evaluation to determine the candidate's composite strength,
this instead of the area "degree of convergence" weights.
Four additional candidate programs and six of the original 18
candidate programs were evaluated using the revised criteria
and procedures. The results revealed some anomalies: not
only did the four additional candidate programs score
generally lower than the six original programs, but the
priority ranking of some original programs was reversed.
B . OBJECTIVES
The general objective of this research was to examine the
impact that the revised evaluation criteria and procedures had
on the priority ranking of candidate programs, and so verify
the accuracy of the revised criteria and procedures at
indicating a program's potential for success as an
international codevelopment agreement.
C. RESEARCH QUESTION
The primary research question addressed by this research
is as follows:
• How can the evaluation conducted by the Navy International
Programs Office on programs being considered for
nomination as international codevelopment agreements be
refined so as to offer a more accurate "front end"
analysis of the candidate programs?
Secondary research questions addressed by this research in
support of the primary research question are as follows:
• What has been the U. S. Government's participation in
international armaments agreements since World War II?
• What are the current issues affecting efforts at
international armaments agreements?
• What are Department of Defense and Department of the Navy
policies and procedures regarding international
codevelopment agreements?
D. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS
1. Scope
This research examines the evaluations performed by IPO on
22 candidate programs from October, 1990 through July, 1991.
Data for this research consist of the original and revised
success criteria, the 18 evaluations conducted using the
original criteria and procedures, and the ten evaluations
conducted using the revised criteria and procedures.
2. Limitations
The only significant limitation affecting this research
was an inability to access the computer program that generated
the evaluation sheets for the International Programs Office;
access to the computer was denied for security reasons. In
lieu of access, computer printouts representing all the
evaluations performed by the IPO during the period of the
research were provided.
3 . Assumptions
The research assumes that the reader has a basic
understanding of spreadsheet calculations and construction.
E. LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY
A literature review was conducted to determine the history
of the U. S. Government's participation in international
armaments agreements since World War II, and to determine
current issues affecting international codevelopment efforts.
A review of relevant Department of Defense instructions and
Department of the Navy reports was conducted to determine
official policy and procedures.
The methodology for this research consisted primarily of
a personal interview with Mr. Frank D. Kenlon, Director for
International Programs with the Navy International Programs
Office in September, 1991. Extensive use is made of a
spreadsheet analysis of the individual evaluation sheets.
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F. OVERVIEW
Chapter II, Background, recounts the U. S. Government's
involvement in international armaments cooperative agreements
with its allies from World War II to present. It additionally
explores current issues in codevelopment and coproduction
agreements, and examines current and proposed Department of
Defense (DoD) and Department of the Navy (DoN) policy
regarding international agreements.
Chapter III, Presentation of Data, displays the data used
in conducting this research. Tables exhibiting the original
and revised success criteria, and individual evaluation sheets
for all program evaluations conducted by the IPO are included.
Chapter IV, Analysis of Data, reproduces the cell -by- cell
spreadsheet analysis of the various evaluation sheets, and
correlates the IPO's success criteria to stated Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD) international program success
indicators
.
Chapter V offers the conclusions and recommendations
developed as a result of the research.
II. BACKGROUND
A. U. S. PARTICIPATION IN MODERN MILITARY ALLIANCES
The United States' involvement in its present day military-
alliances is largely a result of the economic and military
uncertainties that characterized the world in the years
following World War II. The war levied a terrible toll across
the Europe and Asia, so that
. . . the global balance of power after the war would be
totally different from that preceding it. Former Great
Powers- -France, Italy- -were already eclipsed. The German
bid for mastery in Europe was collapsing, as was Japan's
bid in the Far East and Pacific. Britain . . . was
fading .... Only the United States and the USSR
counted, so it seemed; and of the two, the American
"superpower" was vastly superior (Kennedy, 357)
.
Much of the United States' power and prestige lay in its
economic might:
The country's GNP measured in constant 1939 dollars rose
from $88.6 billion (1939) to $135 billion
(1945) .... industrial expansion in the United States
rose at a faster pace . . . than at any period before or
since .... Among the Great Powers, the United States
was the only country which became richer- -in fact, much
richer- -than poorer because of the war (Kennedy, 357-358) .
By comparison, the former Great Powers (Germany, Japan, Italy,
France and Great Britain) all suffered greivous economic
reversals as a result of the war. Germany was divided up into
four military occupation zones, and later, into two countries;
its industrial base, devastated by bombing, was dismantled;
its national income and output dropped over two- thirds between
1938 and 1946 (Kennedy, 365). Japan was similarly occupied;
its national income fell 43 percent from 1936 to 1946
(Kennedy, 365) . Italy's GNP in 1945 was only 60 percent of
its 1938 level (Kennedy, 365-366). France had been plundered
by the Germans for four years and then suffered from the heavy
fighting during 1944; its 1945 income was only 50 percent of
its prewar level (Kennedy, 366). Great Britain fared better
than those countries, but, even so, was suffering economically
at the end of the war; it had depleted its gold and dollar
reserves, worn out its domestic industrial capability, and was
heavily dependent on the United States for much of its arms,
shipping, food and other supplies (Kennedy, 367)
.
The United States' economic might was projected worldwide
by its military power. At the end of the war, the U. S.
military was comprised of some 12.5 million personnel (7.5
million deployed overseas) ; its modern weaponry included 1200
warships, 3000 bombers, and a monopoly of atomic weapons
(Kennedy, 358). Of the European powers, only Great Britain
possessed a credible military force at the end of the war,
with forces deployed to
. North Africa, Italy, Germany, (and) Southeast
Asia. Despite heavy losses, the Royal Navy possessed over
1,000 warships, nearly 3,000 minor war vessels, and nearly
5,500 landing craft. RAF Bomber Command was the second-
largest strategic air force (by far) in the world
(Kennedy, 3 67)
.
If World War II heralded the emergence of the United
States as a superpower, the same must also be said of the
Soviet Union. The increasing Soviet influence can be seen by-
its territorial growth during and after the war. Its European
boundaries expanded
. . . in the north at the expense of Finland, in the
center at the expense of Poland; and in the south,
recovering Bessarabia, at the expense of Rumania. The
Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were
reincorporated into Russia. Part of East Prussia was
taken, and a slice of eastern Czechoslovakia . . . was
also thoughtfully added, so that there was direct access
to Hungary. To the west and southwest of this enhanced
Russia lay a new cordon sanitaire of satellite states,
Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania,
Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Albania (Kennedy, 361)
.
In the Far East, the Soviets occupied Manchuria, North
Korea and Sakhalin and linked up with the Chinese Communists
(Kennedy, 367) . After the war, Stalin would reduce the size
of the Soviet Army by two- thirds
to the still very substantial total of 175
divisions, supported by 25,000 front-line tanks and 19,000
aircraft. It would still remain . . . the largest defense
establishment in the world- -a fact justified . . . by its
need to deter future aggressors and ... to keep control
of its newly acquired satellites in Europe as well as its
conquests in the Far East (Kennedy, 363)
.
The Soviet military strength belied the country's economy,
which was shattered by the war. Estimates put the number of
Soviet deaths as a result of the war at 20-25 million; in
addition, livestock, farm equipment, the transportation
infrastructure, and housing were likewise decimated by the
occupying German Army (Kennedy, 362). In short, "the Russia
of 1945 was a military giant and, at the same time,
economically poor, deprived and unbalanced" (Kennedy, 362)
.
The ideological splitting of Europe into the Capitalist
Western bloc and the Communist Eastern bloc became apparent
soon after the end of the War. It was noted in 1946 and early
in 1947 that
. . . various plebiscites and regional elections in the
German zones (of occupation) were showing "the political
complexion of West Germany . . . beginning to differ
markedly from that of East Germany"; the steady
elimination of any non- Communist elements in Poland,
Bulgaria, and Rumania was mirrored by the internal
political crisis in France in April, 1947, when the
Communists were forced to resign from the government. A
month after, the same happened in Italy. In Yugoslavia,
Tito's political domination (in place of the Allied
wartime agreements about shared power) was interpreted by
the West as a further step in Moscow's planned advance
(Kennedy, 3 75)
.
A two-pronged strategy was developed by the West to
contain what was perceived as the Soviet threat to Western and
Southern Europe. The first element of this strategy
. . . was to indicate to Moscow those regions of the
globe which the United States "cannot permit ... to fall
into hands hostile to us." Such states would ... be
given military support to build up their powers of
resistance; and a Soviet attack on them would be regarded
virtually as a casus belli .... The (second and) most
crucial component of any long-term containment policy
would be a massive program of U. S. economic aid, to
permit the rebuilding of the shattered industries, farms
and cities of Europe and Japan; for that would not only
make the latter far less likely to be tempted by Communist
doctrines of class struggle and revolution, it would also
help to readjust the power balances in America's favor
(Kennedy, 3 76)
In Europe, the economic aid element of the containment
strategy was implemented by the Marshall Plan in 1947; the
military support element would come two years later when,
following the Berlin crisis of 1948-49, the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) was created.
B. U. S. ARMS COOPERATION EFFORTS SINCE WORLD WAR II
In the first decade following the signing of the NATO
treaty, the member nations, confronted by the Sputnik launch
with an eclipsing of Western missile technology, began to
cooperate on armaments (Taft, 15). An early expression of
this cooperative trend was
. the NATO Co -product ion Program agreed by the
Alliance in 1957 .... Since then there have been
literally hundreds of bilateral and multilateral European
and transatlantic cooperative programs- -co- development
,
co-production, licensed production projects, MOU's, dual
production, industry- to- industry efforts, outright weapons
sales, one allied nation to another (Taft, 15)
.
Three phases of the Government's arms cooperation efforts
since World War II can be identified. The first, lasting from
the end of the war until the mid- sixties,
. was characterized by grant aid known as the
Military Assistance Program (MAP) .... the emphasis was
on the no-cost (to the recipient) transfer of equipment
directly from U. S. Force's inventories- -initially surplus
stocks developed as a result of modernization of our own
forces- -or from additional new production of systems being
produced for U. S. Forces (Cole, F-3)
.
Funding for the MAP came entirely from the U. S. Congress; the
funds were administered by a central office, the Director of
Military Assistance, that did not concern itself with the
implementation of the programs by the various acquisition and
logistics Commands involved (Cole, F-3).
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These arrangements worked well. Service hardware
Program Managers had few if any complaints. The equipment
being furnished was standard U. S. The requirements were
easily folded into contracts for equipping U. S. forces;
the funding was U. S. budget authority; and there were no
issues of R&D recoupment, administrative surcharges, asset
use charges, agent fees, co-production, offsets, MOUs
,
etc., that became commonplace for providing U. S. arms to
friends and allies (Cole, F-3)
.
The second phase of arms cooperation overlaps the first
but can be characterized by
... a gradual shift from MAP to sales on a government-
to-government basis usually referred to as Foreign
Military Sales (FMS) , and to direct commercial sales
(Cole, F-3)
.
The Foreign Military Sales program
. initially focused on the stronger economies of
European NATO . . . with the objective of having allies
obviously able to pay their own way assume larger shares
of the common defense burden.
MAP procedures continued for most other countries
friendly or allied to the United States and also for some
European NATO allies (Cole, 13-14)
.
Responsibility for FMS was transferred from the Director
of Military Assistance to the newly established position of
Director of International Logistics, and later, along with
responsibility for MAP, to the Director of the Defense
Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) upon that agency's
establishment in 1971 (Cole, F-3 - F-4) . Congress began to
curtail MAP funds, with the result that DSAA attention became
increasingly focused on FMS transactions; FMS credits became
the means by which countries progressed from MAP to cash sales
(Cole, F-4)
. DSAA (conceived as simply the fund manager and
resident authority for international arms programs)
,
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eventually became "firmly astride and enmeshed in the
acquisition and logistics function" (Cole, F-4) . In response,
the
. . . OSD acquisition and logistics staffs, the Military
Departments and Logistics Commands demanded and received
a greater voice in international arms matters. By 1976
program direction had become diffused and controversies
were common (Cole, F-4)
.
A DoD task force, charged by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld
with reviewing Security Assistance, recommended on January 14,
1977 that DSAA should report directly to the Defense
Acquisition Executive vice the Assistant Secretary of Defense-
International Security Affairs, but this recommendation was
never acted upon by the incoming Carter Administration (Cole,
F-4) .
The third (and current) phase of the Government's arms
cooperation efforts is characterized by declining U. S. arms
exports and an increase in the number of codevelopment
agreements (Cole, F-4) . An examination of this phase occurs
in later in this chapter as part of the discussion of
Rationalization, Standardization and Interoperability (RSI) as
it applies to NATO.
C. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF ARMS COOPERATION
The most obvious advantage to two or more countries
entering an arms cooperation agreement is economic. Thomas A.
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Callaghan notes:
For centuries commercial economics and trade have been
moving towards ever-larger markets, providing economies of
scale and ever more affordable prices .... Defense
economics has bucked this trend. Here we have ever-larger
product lines, ever-smaller production runs, small
national markets, and (consequently) ever-higher prices
(Callaghan, 61) .
It follows, then, that an increase in the market for a
weapon system through arms cooperation agreements would lead
to fewer product lines, larger production runs, and lower
prices. This simple fact was
. . . first appreciated within Europe, and more so than
in the United States. There were good reasons for this,
not least of which were the budgetary constraints with
which the European states were faced, the range of
conventional operational requirements they had to meet
with considerable fewer resources, and the comparatively
small production run each could afford on any one program
(Edmonds, 11)
.
But this logic holds true for any arms cooperation
agreement in that all the participating countries would
experience cost reductions through
improvements in production arising from the
learning process, through quantity purchase of materials
and parts, better use of fixed capital and steady cash
flows (Edmonds, 11) -
Two political arguments can be made as well in favor of
arms cooperation agreements. First, a weapon system that can
be demonstrably shown to have reduced unit costs would be more
likely to be accepted by the citizens of a country, especially
when the risks associated with developing and producing the
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weapon system could be shared with other nations (Edmonds, 11-
12). Secondly, a country that participates in arms
cooperation agreements with its allies
demonstrates a willingness to adjust purely
national priorities in the interest of alliance cohesion
and, arguably, a willingness to further the wider
political objectives of creating interdependencies among
. . . allies and . . . establishing an integrated defense
industry (Edmonds, 12).
A final advantage to arms cooperation agreements is that
it is militarily more desirable for alliance forces operating
in conjunction with each other to be equipped with
standardized weapons, logistics and communications systems
(Edmonds , 14)
.
Set against these reasons to enter arms cooperation
agreements are the pressures inherent in a sovereign state to
maintain a unique domestic arms production capability; it
would be disadvantageous for a nation to enter such an
agreement when it is that government's desire
to limit reliance upon external sources of
military equipment, to reduce the burden of imports on
their balance of trade, and to ensure maximum employment




cooperation in armaments is not an area of
national policy isolated from security policy or from more
general domestic and foreign policy concerns. As a result
of this linkage, nations desire armament self-sufficiency,
to the extent economically and politically feasible, in
order to avoid dependence on others ... in formulating
and implementing policy objectives (Shaffer, 27)
.
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In addition, compelling reasons of national security could
often deter one country from entering an arms cooperation
agreement due to the possibility of sensitive technology
transfer.
D. FORCES CONTRIBUTING TO ARMS DIVERSITY
The earliest attempts at arms cooperation in NATO led to
a certain homogeneity of weapons among the alliance members in
that "virtually all military equipment was supplied by the
United States" (Shaffer, 29). This uniformity, driven by
necessity as much as the booming postwar American economy,
soon fragmented.
Five specific factors have been identified as contributing
to the push toward NATO weapons diversity. The first of
these factors is NATO's " overreliance on nuclear weapons to
the detriment of conventional forces" (Cannizzo, 57)
,
especially in the early years of the NATO alliance:
Presuming themselves safe from conventional attack by
the USSR and its allies, (NATO) general purpose forces
were by and large starved of resources and left to
deteriorate; the member states were left free to a large
degree to go their separate, sovereign ways in pursuit of
national security .... The United States strongly
advocated this reliance on massive retaliation and did not
particularly mind the burgeoning proliferation of
different types of conventional weapons systems (Cannizzo,
57) .
The United States' support of a strategic defense of NATO
should be viewed in light of its then vastly superior nuclear
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arsenal and its later commitment of conventional forces to the
conflicts in Korea and Vietnam.
The second factor that advanced weapons diversity in NATO
is closely related to the first:
The United States encouraged the postwar rebuilding of
European defense industries in order not to overtax the
"arsenal of democracy" and to help spur reconstruction
efforts (Cannizzo, 57)
.
A third factor derives from the economic problems
afflicting the United States beginning in the early sixties
brought on by an unfavorable balance of trade and the flow of
gold passing through U. S. borders (Cannizzo, 57):
The United States patently became more interested in
forcing the Europeans to buy U. S. equipment and in
finding ways to offset the cost of stationing U. S. troops
abroad than it was in fostering weapons cooperation. Such
policies constituted a source of irritation for the
European Allies, which was compounded by the "buy
American" acts .... Not only the United States has
continuing economic difficulties, but the Europeans have
as well, which today have helped create a situation more
compatible with protectionism than international
cooperation (Cannizzo, 57)
.
Cannizzo identifies the United States' involvement in
Vietnam as the fourth factor lending to NATO weapons
diversity:
The diversion of U. S. interests and attention to
Southeast Asia clearly reduced U. S. participation in NATO
affairs and procurement policies . . . the United States
drew on its stocks of equipment in Europe and . . . this
left large gaps which remain unfilled even today
(Cannizzo, 57)
.
Finally, Cannizzo points to the NATO experience with arms
cooperation projects themselves as leading to diversity.
Citing the consortium created to manage the coproduction of
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the F-16 as an example, Cannizzo points to a myriad of
problems
:
. . . charges of bribery and even hints of murder during
the bargaining and selection phases; continual cost
increases; acrimonious debate over unfulfilled promises of
jobs, income, and other benefits; disagreements over
third- country sales; and even disgruntlement over the
plane's performance (Cannizzo, 57).
Another example of an unsuccessful NATO joint program was
the attempt by the United States and West Germany to develop
the MBT-70 battle tank which "ended in failure after more than
$400 million had been invested" (Kitfield, "Finally, " 77)
.
The current NATO policy of "Rationalization,
Standardization, and Interoperability" (RSI) is the latest
expression of the alliance's efforts to promote arms
cooperation with the hope of realizing
not only the militarily desirable goal of
standardizing equipment and harmonizing logistical
procedures, but also the politically desirable goal of
alliance solidarity (Feldman, 48)
.
E. THE EVOLUTION OF RSI
RSI is intrinsically tied to the theory of "structural
disarmament" as formulated by Callaghan. Callaghan states
that the Western nations are
. . . experiencing (a) disarmament phenomenon of more
and more money producing fewer and fewer weapons, less
"readiness," and even less combat sustainability . The
cause is structural . No nation- -not even the US- -provides
a large enough defense market to develop and produce
everything itself (Callaghan, 61)
17
This section will examine the concept of RSI, and will trace
its implementation through laws enacted by the United States
Congress and policy directed by the President and the
Department of Defense.
A definition of terms is in order:
"Rationalization" is defined as any action which
increases the effectiveness of NATO by improving the
command- support structure and consolidating the various
national logistical systems. It includes standardization,
specialization, interoperability, cross-servicing, and
general cooperation of military and non-military matters.
"Standardization" refers to the achievement of the
closest practical cooperation among forces, sharing of
systems designs, agreement on operational, administrative,
and logistic procedures, and common tactical doctrine and
organization.
"Interoperability" consists of making different weapons
systems work together by using common or compatible
components, fuel, and ammunition (Feldman, 50).
As was previously mentioned, a high level of
standardization was achieved in the early years of NATO by the
simple fact that most weapons were provided by the United
States. Continued economic aid to the European allies by the
United States led to a rebuilding of European industry so
that, by the late 1950s, "European industry was sufficiently
recovered to permit the independent development of exclusively
European weapons systems" (Feldman, 51)
.
The Warsaw Pact modernization of the 1970s and the
realization that NATO was wasting up to $15 billion a year
because of weapons diversity led to a renewed call for
standardization in conjunction with the rearming of NATO
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(Feldman, 51) . But purely national concerns often overrode
alliance concerns so that
. . . NATO leaders found it increasingly difficult to
convince parliaments to spend large amounts of foreign
exchange on the purchase of weapons from abroad, because
of their fear of generating domestic unemployment.
Therefore, most NATO members began in the 1970s to demand
economic compensation in the form of "offsets" such as
coproduction or countertrade as a condition of purchase
(Feldman, 51) .
In the United States, the Government began to take the
initiative in promoting RSI. An amendment to the Defense
Appropriation Authorization Act of 1975 called for the
Secretary of Defense to ascertain the cost of the failure to
standardize weapons in NATO and to develop a plan for arms
cooperation (Feldman, 51) . The 1976 Nunn amendment encouraged
reciprocal procurement of equipment between the U. S. and
other NATO nations; authorized the SECDEF to waive the "Buy
American" law in the interest of NATO standardization and
interoperability; and enabled the establishment of bilateral
reciprocal procurement MOUs between the U. S. and the European
nations of NATO (Naval, 25)
.
President Ford introduced the two-way street concept to
the Europeans at the 1976 NATO summit, and advised them that,
to compete effectively with U. S. defense industry, the
Europeans would have to sacrifice some national concerns and
combine their resources (Feldman, 52)
.
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The Carter administration approached arms cooperation from
two almost diametrically opposing views. On the one hand, the
administration
. . . wanted to greatly decrease the U. S. sales of
weapons around the world, thus avoiding a reputation as
"Merchants of Death." Correspondence, dubbed the "Leprosy
Letter," was sent to all U. S. embassies early in the
Carter administration prohibiting support and assistance
to U. S. defense industry corporations trying to sell
overseas. Legislation was enacted by Congress disallowing
foreign marketing expenses to be charged as a valid cost
of doing business (Naval, 23)
.
On the other hand, the Carter administration encouraged arms
cooperative agreements with allies; in particular, Under
Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering William
Perry greatly furthered the cause of RSI. Through Perry's DoD
Directive 2010.6, a three-pronged approach to RSI was
implemented:
First, the general and reciprocal procurement Memoranda
of Understanding (MOUs) . . . were to be used to create a
"two-way street" in defense trade. Each country would
agree to remove domestic obstacles to the mutual
penetration of defense markets. Each country would obtain
exemptions from the other's customs, duties, tariffs, and
protectionist legislation. In addition, each country
would ideally give equal consideration to all qualified
bidders regardless of the firm's nationality ....
The second prong . . . was called "Dual Production, " and
attempted to avoid redundant research and development
(R&D) expenditures by encouraging nations to produce a
system already developed by another member ....
The third
. . . strategy for achieving RSI was called
the "Family of Weapons" approach .... it began
collaboration at the R&D stage, requiring complete sharing
of technology and know-how. It called for the
complementary development of weapon systems in a
particular mission area to be allocated to different
countries, sequentially produced, and then made available
to other members for production or co-production (Feldman,
52) .
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The first of these strategies, the negotiation of MOUs to
aid in arms cooperation, received widespread support
throughout NATO. Currently, formal agreements exist between
the United States and 19 allied countries regarding arms
cooperation. "Dual Production" continues to be favored by the
DoD and the U. S. defense industry because "it approached
standardization by relying on competitive R&D followed by
licensed production or co-production" (Feldman, 52). The
"Family of Weapons" approach was unpopular in America, on the
industrial side because it called for relinquishing
proprietary data (Feldman, 52) , and on the military side
because of high level concern "over the flow of critical
technology to the Eastern bloc" (Kitfield, "Finally, " 77) .
The Reagan administration approached arms cooperation with
an entirely different attitude. Armaments cooperation
. . . was pushed on all fronts. The "Leprosy Letter"
was repudiated; the first international cooperative
development program was started (Terminally Guided Warhead
for the Multiple Launch Rocket System) ; defense
cooperation offices were established in most major U. S.
embassies to promote cooperation; and over thirty new
cooperative development MOUs were signed (Naval, 24).
Two other developments in RSI implementation during this
period are the Nunn amendments to the FY85 and FY86 Defense
Appropriations Authorization Act. The former professes the
Government's support of RSI
. . . but intends to achieve it by creating an open,
competitive market in defense equipment- -a trading
structure that is hoped will accomplish more than the
"piecemeal" government MOUs of (the) past (Feldman, 53).
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The latter takes a more proactive role by requiring all new
weapon development programs be examined for possible
international cooperation; by providing $100M as "seed money"
for new, international codevelopment programs; and by
providing $25M to allow the U. S. to test and evaluate systems
already developed by Allies prior to beginning domestic
production of similar systems (Naval, 26). Congressional
funding in support of cooperative developments climbed from
$100M in FY86, to $145M in FY87, to $150M in FY88, to $153M in
FY89, before falling to $115M in FY90 (Cole, 61). Also in
1987, the Quayle amendment permitted the DoD to cooperate with
foreign nations from R&D through procurement (Naval, 25-26).
President Bush has generally continued the arms
cooperation policies of his predecessor. The Bush
Administration has
. . . directed embassy personnel to increase the level
of assistance provided to U. S. defense companies, created
the Center for Defense Trade within the State Department,
and proposed a "defense GATT" (General Agreement on Trade
and Tariffs) that would allow free and open trade in arms
and defense technology within the NATO Alliance, and with
other U. S. Allies. In March 1991, the Administration
proposed that the Export- Import Bank guarantee up to $1
billion in commercial loans to members of NATO, Australia,
Japan and Israel to purchase defense equipment from U. S.
contractors (U. S. Congress, 21).
On April 16, 1990, the President issued his policy on
offset agreements. In essence, the policy prohibits the
United States Government from participating in
. . . any guarantees of offsets to any allied government
or participating industry. This participation goes so far
as to say that no agency can encourage, enter directly
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into, or commit U. S. companies to any offset arrangements
as they relate to any sale of defense articles or services
to other governments. Additionally no U. S. funds may be
used to finance offsets .... The new guidance does not
prohibit negotiations for offsets by any government with
the commercial industries involved as long as there is no
U. S. Government encouragement, participation or
commitment for the offset agreements which might be
finally realized (McCarroll, 6-7).
F. IMPACT OF RSI
Objectively, the impact of the various RSI initiatives can
best be appreciated by examining the balance in defense trade
between the United States and the European allies. Most
analysts agree that in the 1970s, the ratio of defense trade
between the U. S. and its NATO allies was as much as 10:1 in
favor of the United States (Costello, 70; Kitfield,
"Obstacles," 86). Following Perry's RSI initiatives, this
ratio was reduced to a level of 4.8:1 in favor of the U. S. in
FY84 (Roos, 23) . The figures for FY86 show a further leveling
off of the trade ratio, to 1.6:1 in favor of the United States
(Kitfield, "Obstacles," 86; Roos, 23); this last ratio can be
interpreted considering Nunn amendment. Other interpretations
can be offered for the decline- -Kitfield points out that the
FY84 figures are, in part at least, because the European
nations reduced their defense purchases from the United States
by 45 percent from the previous year (Kitfield, "Finally,
"
76) . However, Congressional calculations show that the
transatlantic defense trade ratio, which in 1981 had reached
a high of 12:1 in favor of the U. S., had only dropped to
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about 5.2:1 in 1988 (U. S. Congress, 49). In any event, the
overall trend proves that some effort has been expended in
behalf of RSI.
Another set of figures that reinforces the declining trade
ratio balances concerns military contracts:
The amount of U. S. military contracts awarded abroad
nearly doubled (during the period FY80 to FY86) from $5.4
billion to $9 billion .... During the same period,
foreign military sales (FMS) by U. S. companies were cut
in half, from $14.8 billion in 1980 to $7.1 billion (in
1986) (Kitfield, "Obstacles," 86).
G. OBSTACLES ON THE TWO-WAY STREET
Although RSI is vigorously promoted on both sides of the
Atlantic, very real obstacles impede optimal progress down the
"two-way street."
On this side of the Atlantic, a general problem is that
there is not a clear, national consensus in support of RSI:
RSI never became a "national decision, " its proponents
having failed to win the blessing of Congress, the
military services, industry, and labor .... Each group,
for a variety of reasons, has at one time or another
obstructed or resisted RSI (Feldman, 53).
Four major obstacles can be identified:
• the "not invented here" syndrome;
• economic protectionism;
• technological isolationism;
• the NATO burdensharing controversy (Feldman, 54)
.
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The "not invented here" syndrome is primarily a military
criticism of RSI which rests on three pillars. First, the
Pentagon is rightfully concerned about any arms cooperative
program that could "leave the U. S. dependent on a foreign
source for any component of its defense needs" (Feldman, 54)
.
Secondly, the Pentagon reasons that "a variety of non-
standardized defense systems would be more likely to thwart
Soviet counter-measures than a few standardized systems"
(Feldman, 54) . Finally, some officials fear that the quality
of our forces' weapons might be sacrificed to achieve the
political goal of armaments cooperation (Feldman, 54).
The obstacle of economic protectionism is a Congressional
reaction to RSI. Although the MOUs were negotiated to ease
the restrictions of protectionist statutes, elected officials
can still be influenced by both industry and labor in their
districts. For instance, the
. . Aerospace Industries Association (AIA) and the
Electronic Industries Association (EIA) . . . have
testified before Congress . . . that RSI is a form of
"affirmative action" for the Europeans .... The
implications for U. S. jobs are great, according to the
AIA, which estimates that for every $1 billion in export
sales lost, 70,000 U. S. jobs disappear as well (Feldman,
55) .
Constraining armaments cooperation, Congress has supported the
Arms Export Control and the Export Administration Acts; has
enacted the requirement that the Department of Commerce
participate in the already slow MOU process; and has included
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individual protectionist measures in most of the recent
Defense Authorization Acts (Naval, 26).
Perhaps the greatest obstacle on the two-way street is the
issue of burdensharing, which arises from the perception that
"some countries (in the NATO alliance) may be doing more, or
not doing enough, in contributing to collective security"
(Lightburn, 26) . The issue has often been couched in terms of
each member's financial and military contribution to NATO
expressed as a percentage of GNP/GDP. A recently completed
study by NATO has explored the burdensharing problem.
The study, done in 1988, recognized that there were many
factors, besides financial and military, that comprised a
country's contributions to the alliance, and that these
factors could not all be quantified or compared (Lightburn,
26). Nevertheless, an assessment for each country's total
contribution was estimated and agreed upon by all other
countries in the alliance (Lightburn, 27) . As a result of
these assessments, proposals were formulated to maintain the
quality of the allied defence, to redress some deficiencies
that the assessments discovered, and to enhance security in
the future (Lightburn, 27-28)
:
In the first of these categories, . . . countries were
asked to improve their performance in meeting NATO goals,
to enhance the forces which are committed to the Alliance,
to improve force sustainability, to continue to support
commonly funded programmes, to strive for improved
armaments cooperation, to provide more assistance to
developing defence industry nations and to search for
greater efficiencies in the defence area. In the second
category, . . . countries were asked to consider
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improvements to the NATO Composite Force for North Norway,
to the Allied Command Europe (ACE) Mobile Force and to the
on- call naval force in the Mediterranean, to improve where
possible host country support arrangements, to enhance
reinforcement capabilities and to improve the Alliance's
airborne early warning capability. The third category
challenged countries to look at a better rationalization
of existing defence arrangements, to examine and improve
the potential of reserve and mobilizable capabilities, and
to explore other ways of enhancing security through
additional common or joint funding of requirements
(Lightburn, 28)
.
H. DOD SUPPORT OF ARMAMENTS COOPERATIONS
The Department of Defense has supported both Executive and
Congressional efforts to further armaments cooperations.
Directives are in place which form the basis of Defense
Department policy on international armaments cooperation.
Some key directives are listed below:
• DoD Directive 2000.9, "International Co- Production
Projects and Agreements Between the United States and
Other Countries or International Organizations," dated
January 23, 19 74.
DoD Directive 3100.3, "Cooperation with Allies in Research
and Development of Defense Equipment, " dated September 27,
1963.
DoD Directive 3100.4, "Harmonization of Qualitative
Requirements for Defense Equipment of the United States
and Allies," dated September 27, 1963.
DoD Directive 5530.3, "International Agreements," dated
June 11, 1987.
Directive 2000.9 is currently being revised; its revision
would cancel the original 2000.9 and Directives 3100.3 and
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3100.4, along with various memoranda issued by the Department.
The draft revision proposes a ten-point DoD policy concerning
international armaments cooperation; it says that it would be
DoD policy that
• The DoD would cooperate with U. S. Allies in the research
and development, testing and evaluation (RDT&E)
;
production; procurement; sale and follow- on support of
conventional defense equipment when such cooperation
promotes U. S. foreign policy objectives; U. S. security
interests; the fulfillment of validated operational
requirements; an approach for integrating DoD's
requirement generation, acquisition management, and
planning, programming and budgeting systems; and the
maintenance or improvement of the U. S. defense industrial
base.
• The DoD would participate in cooperative programs that
foster the collective security by encouraging participants
to adopt interoperable equipment, compatible support
arrangements, and common operational doctrine; by
encouraging participants to invest appropriately in modern
conventional defense; by making the most efficient use of
the total scientific, technical, financial and industrial
resources available to participants; and by fostering
defense industrial capabilities in all participating
countries to meet the military requirements of the
alliance
.
• The DoD would maximize its resources available for defense
of the alliance by conserving DoD resources through access
to those foreign defense goods and services that provide
cost-effective alternatives for meeting U. S. operational
requirements; and by facilitating the common defense of
the alliance through promoting equitable access to the
most cost effective goods, technology and services,
reducing duplicate efforts at RDT&E, production and
support, and by fostering a more efficient market for
defense goods.
• The DoD would encourage consensus and validation of
military requirements through treaties or agreements at
the earliest practicable stage in the requirements'
generation, and through all stages of the requirements'
formulation.
• The DoD would authorize the release of classified or
unclassified U. S. information and technology if such
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disclosure was subject to a Technology Assessment Control
Plan and if such disclosure complied with law and other
DoD Directives.
• The DoD would protect and advance the U. S. industrial
base in negotiating and implementing cooperative
agreements by considering the effects of the agreements on
the defense industrial base; and by interfacing with the
Department of Commerce (DOC) regarding the implications of
agreements on the industrial competitive position of U. S.
industry.
• The DoD would prepare an industrial base factors analysis
for each agreement to assess the defense industrial
implications of cooperative agreements.
• The DoD would not encourage, enter directly into, or
commit U. S. firms to any offset arrangement through a
cooperative agreement except as directed by the President
through the National Security Council.
• The DoD would maintain a consistent approach to
cooperative agreements by negotiating and concluding all
agreements in accordance with DoD Directive 5530.3 or the
Security Assistance Management Manual, as applicable.
• The DoD would continually monitor and review cooperative
programs to ensure consistency with U. S. interests and
objectives, and would maintain a consolidated index of all
cooperative agreements (Draft, 2-6).
DoD Directive 553 0.3 "International Agreements"
establishes the requirements for, and restrictions on,
authority to negotiate or conclude an international agreement.
The directive defines "international agreement" broadly as any
agreement concluded with one or more foreign governments that
is signed or agreed to by personnel of the U. S. Government,
that signifies the intention of the parties to be bound in
international law, and that is identified as an international
agreement or other similar language (2-1). The definition
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specifically excludes certain other official compacts made by
Government personnel such as contracts made under the Federal
Acquisition Regulations (FAR) and Foreign Military Sales (FMS)
Credit Agreements (2-1). DoD Directive 5530.3 establishes
standard procedures for requesting authority to negotiate or
conclude international agreements, and assigns responsibility
for that authority to the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy (USD(P)). For certain categories of agreements, the
directive delegates authority to negotiate and conclude
international agreements to the Service Secretaries, the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) , the Director of
the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) , the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition (USD (A)), and others.
I. DON SUPPORT OF ARMAMENTS COOPERATION
In December, 1989, a Naval Research Advisory Committee
(NRAC) Report on International Research and Development (NRAC
Report No. 89-7) was completed. The committee panel was
comprised of representatives from Government, private
industry, and universities, and chaired by Mr. Gerald Cann,
then of General Dynamics Corporation. The panel had been
formed to address the following questions as they pertained to
the Navy's international cooperative research and development
(IR&D) programs:
• How may the Navy enhance identification and assessment of
foreign technologies to facilitate both the rapid and long
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term incorporation of these technologies into naval weapon
systems?
• How may the Navy better identify potential cooperative
development programs? What fundamental elements impact
the success or failure of a cooperative development?
Which elements should be considered in determining
priority?
• What role can industry assume to facilitate international
cooperative programs and take advantage of available
foreign technologies? What is necessary to maximize
industry involvement in these programs and strengthen the
U. S. industrial base? How may IR&D funding be used in
these programs?
• What incentives should be offered to promote international
cooperative programs? How may the Navy reward program
managers and industry for cost savings achieved through
successful programs?
• How may international programs be used to promote the
maritime strategy objectives of the Navy?
• How may the coordination and review of Navy international
programs be improved? What organizational changes are
necessary?
• Are the fiscal goals established by the OSD for service
participation in international programs, practical and
adequate?
• How will new legislation, requiring Department of Commerce
review of all proposed international cooperative
development Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) , impact Navy
programs and U. S. industry (Naval, 15-16).
An immediate cause for the panel's formation was the fact
that two ongoing cooperative programs had been recently
cancelled and several others appeared to be in trouble (Naval,
3). Factors underlying the cancellations were readily
discernible. These included changes in the external
environment in which IR&D is conducted; the lack of a formal
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national policy on international armaments cooperation; and
the means by which armaments cooperative agreements are
impacted by actions of Congress, the Department of Defense and
the Department of the Navy (Naval, 3).
The panel recognized several trends in the external
environment that impact on the Navy's IR&D efforts, central of
which is the increasing " globalization of the economy ,
industry and trade . This, in turn, has fostered increasing
interdependence among nations " (Naval, 21) . The panel
acknowledged an erosion in the United States' traditional
leadership position in several important
(technological) areas, such as microelectronics, ceramics
and manufacturing process technology. Foreign capability
in the design of integrated circuits, launch vehicles and
commercial aircraft underscores the general trend toward
technology leveling . As a result, intense competitive
pressure has promoted widespread dual use of our most
advanced technologies (Naval, 21).
A final environmental trend identified by the panel was
the fact that our focus on the threats facing our nation was
shifting from a military threat by the Soviet bloc to an
economic threat by the other industrialized nations of the
world, specifically the Pacific Rim nations and Western Europe
(Naval, 21). The panel attributed industry's narrow
. . . preoccupation with short term profit and corporate
book value (with putting) us at a distinct disadvantage in
dealing with Japan's longer goal of securing market share
(Naval, 21)
.
Concerning the Government's national policy on
international armaments cooperation, the panel was quick to
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point out that the Government has no formal national policy
even though
. . . armaments cooperation with North Atlantic Treaty-
Organization (NATO) and other friendly countries has been
an integral part of DoD's RDT&E and production procurement
programs since World War II (Naval, 23)
.
Instead of a formal, written policy on international armaments
cooperation, an ad hoc policy evolved "in accordance with the
prevailing international views held by each administration"
(Naval, 23) .
The panel recognized that the Department of the Navy has
generally followed OSD direction for international armaments
cooperation by issuing SECNAV instructions that direct
compliance with the relevant DoD Directives and by generating
its own set of OPNAV instructions to provide guidelines for
conducting MOU negotiations (Naval, 29). The NRAC panel did
level some criticism at DoN for not being sufficiently
sensitive to U. S. industrial base concerns and for the ultra-
conservative position the Navy has traditionally taken
regarding the licensing of its equipment for use and sales
overseas (Naval, 30).
J. THE NAVY INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS OFFICE (IPO)
Coordination of the Navy's international armaments
cooperative efforts is accomplished by the International
Programs Office (IPO) , reporting to the Deputy Assistant
Secretary of the Navy for International Policy (DASN(IP)) . In
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IPO, the Director for International Agreements is responsible
for oversight of the acquisition MOUs, for assisting in the
development and negotiations of MOUs by the Program Managers,
and for policy coordination.
The IPO office traditionally, at regular intervals, issued
a "call" for Candidate Nomination Proposals (CNPs) throughout
the various Program Offices of the Navy. Offices whose
programs were fully funded typically declined to submit CNPs
while offices facing shortfalls and budget cuts proposed
programs for MOU consideration.
Recent procedures established by DoD Instruction 5000.2,
"Defense Acquisition Management Policies and Procedures, " may
lead to an increase in both the quantity and quality of
candidate programs. The instruction requires that a report be
submitted to Congress annually regarding international
cooperative efforts. The report, the Cooperative Research and
Development Projects Report, is prepared by the Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense for International Programs (DUSD(IP)),
and reviews Acquisition Category I (ACAT I) , Major Defense
Acquisition Programs, activity for the year (ll-D-1-3). The
report will provide Congress with two pieces of information:
• A description of status, funding and schedule of existing
cooperative research and development projects for which a
Memorandum of Understanding (or other formal agreement)
has been entered into;
• A description of the purpose, funding and schedule of any
proposed new projects included in the President's budget
proposal for which a Memorandum of Understanding (or other
formal agreement) has not been entered into (ll-D-1-3).
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The instruction also requires that a Cooperative Opportunities
Document be included as Annex G to the Integrated Program
Summary document as part of the Defense Acquisition Board
(DAB) Milestones Review procedures (ll-C-3) . This requirement
applies to all Acquisition Categories programs at Milestones
I through IV; the Cooperative Opportunities Document would
address the following areas:
• Are there any similar projects in development or
production by one or more major allies of the United
States?
• If yes, could that project satisfy, or be modified in
scope so as to satisfy, the military requirements of the
United States?
• What are the advantages and disadvantages of seeking to
structure a cooperative development program with one or
more Allied nations?
• What alternate forms of cooperation could be appropriate
for this project (DoD Manual 5000. 2M, 4-H-l-l and -2)1
The IP Office also targets likely MOU prospects through the
annual Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS)
review process, during which the office focuses primarily on
mid- level programs (ACAT II programs, the lower range of ACAT
I programs, and the upper range of ACAT III programs)
.
Once the IP Office identifies a candidate cooperative
program, either through a successful PPBS targeting or a call
for candidate programs, the office discusses the program with
the originator to assess the program's potential as a
cooperative agreement. For programs with significant
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potential, the originator drafts and submits a Project
Nomination Proposal (PNP) to the IPO. The IPO then performs
the "quick look" evaluation that is the subject of this
research; those proposals evaluated likely to succeed are
forwarded for notification to the Deputy Assistant Secretary
of the Navy for International Policy (DASN(IP) ) . The DASN(IP)
either sends the PNP back to IPO with feedback or submits the
PNP to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research,
Development and Acquisition (ASN(RD&A)) for approval to
Request Authority to Negotiate (RAN) . Once ASN(RDStA) approval
is obtained, the IPO submits the PNP to the USD (A) for
authority to negotiate in accordance with DoD Directive
5530.3.
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III. PRESENTATION OF DATA
A. BACKGROUND TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF SUCCESS CRITERIA
1. Original Evaluation Procedure
The IP Office originally used the following 20-point
checklist to evaluate Project Nomination Proposals:
• MOU REQUIREMENT. Why must a MOU be employed? Is use of
a MOU based on legal or policy grounds? Would use of
another international program mechanism (e.g., FMS LOA,
export license, etc.) achieve the same objectives?
• LEGAL. If a MOU is required, which statute (s) provide
authority for the MOU? More specifically, what is the
statutory authority for each of the obligations undertaken
by the U. S. Government in the MOU?
• NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS. How many nations desire to
participate in the MOU? (Note that in general, bilateral
agreements are encouraged.)
• MOU SCHEDULE. Can authority to negotiate be obtained and
can a MOU be negotiated and concluded in time to meet
desired program schedule (s)
?
• PROGRAM OBJECTIVE. Is the objective of the MOU clearly
stated? What is the motivation and benefit to the U. S.
Government? What is the perceived motivation and benefit
to the foreign government (s) ? (Note that the combination
of the two must create a "win-win" situation in order for
the program to succeed.)
• PROGRAM REQUIREMENT. Is there a documented U. S.
requirement which has:
- OPNAV support and/or approval?
- CINC/JCS support and/or approval?
- SYSCOM/Lab support and/or approval?
- RD&A support and/or approval?
- OSD support and/or approval?
- Congressional support and/or approval?
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• Is the combined U. S. -foreign requirement clearly stated
in the MOU, and does it realistically reflect the needs of
all parties?
• PROGRAM SCOPE OF WORK. Are proposed program tasks and
associated schedules clearly stated? Will they achieve
program objectives and meet program requirements in the
areas of technical performance, cost and schedule?
• MANAGEMENT. Will this be a U. S. managed project, a
foreign country managed project, or a jointly managed
project? What is the management hierarchy (steering
groups, program offices, etc.)? Will the program
office (s) be integrated or not?
• FINANCIAL. What is the total cost of the project
(financial and non-f inancial) ? What is the U. S. share
(financial/non- financial) versus the foreign share? What
is the United States/foreign cost share rationale
(production off -take, equal share, etc.), and are the
contributions versus benefits equitable? What are the
U. S. sources of funds/non- financial contributions? If
DoN funds, are they in the budget/POM? If Nunn funds,
have they been approved by DoN/OSD? If NRC waiver (s) are
proposed, have they been approved by DoN/OSD and/or
foreign governments involved?
• CURRENCY. Will the program be managed in U. S. dollars,
foreign currency, or a mix? Will the establishment of a
joint program bank account be required?
• CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENTS. Will U. S. contractual
procedures be used or not? Who will serve as the U. S.
contracting agency (if applicable)? What type of contract
(FFP, CPIF, etc.) will be employed? Are there any special
arrangements or procedures? If so, are they in accordance
with the FAR?
• WORK- SHARE. If a cooperative MOU, what is the anticipated
division of work- share among participants, by volume and
by type (high tech, low tech) ? Does the proposed work-
share align with cost-share (i. e. is it equitable)?
• OFFSET AGREEMENTS
. Are there industrial offset agreements
addressed in the MOU that are associated with this
program? Will the U. S. Government play a role? Is that
role consistent with DoD policy on offsets?
• INDUSTRIAL BASE IMPACT. What will be the impact on the
U. S. industrial base (including sub- tier suppliers) of
proposed work- share/of f set agreements?
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• INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS. What background and
foreground data rights are anticipated to be transferred
to foreign participants? Do U. S. rights align with U. S.
contributions? (Note that for substantial U. S.
contributions, we should obtain a greater degree of data
rights than our prospective partners.)
• TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER. Are sensitive technologies to be
shared or transferred? Have such transfers been cleared
through DoN and OSD (DTSA) ? Is TTSARB approval required?
Has disclosure guidance to the negotiating team been
developed and issued? Has a Delegation of Disclosure
Letter (DDL) to the Program Manager (PM) been issued?
• DISCLOSURE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION. Will U. S.
classified information or material be disclosed to foreign
nationals during the course of the program? Is approval
by the National Disclosure Policy Committee (NDPC)
required? (Note that both technology transfer and
disclosure of CMI should be addressed in the MOU
negotiating guidance and DDL.)
• THIRD PARTY SALES AND TRANSFERS. Will future U. S.
disclosures require concurrence of other participants?
(Note that if the U. S. possesses considerable "background
equity" in the program, permitting foreign "veto" of
potential U. S. sales should be avoided.)
• MOU CLARITY. Does the MOU clearly state the arrangements
listed above or are they to be documented by side
agreements?
• REQUIRED DOCUMENTATION. Have the following supporting
documents been prepared: Legal Memorandum; Fiscal
Memorandum, Technology Security Risk Assessment (or its
successor, Technology Assessment and Control Plan)
;
Industrial Base Factors Analysis?
The IP Office halted use of the checklist since it offered an
entirely subjective overview and since it could not provide a
methodology for comparing one PNP to another.
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2. OSD Decision Matrix
The IP Office considered adopting the following four-part
decision matrix used by the Office of the Secretary of Defense
for selecting programs to pursue among those nominated for
international research and development projects:
SUITABILITY FOR HIGH (9 PTS) MEDIUM (4 LOW (1 PT)
COLLABORATION RED PTS) YELLOW GREEN
1. STATUS OF MOU SIGNED IN PROCESS PROCESS NOT
YET STARTED
2. LIKELIHOOD OF CONSISTENT REQUIRES REQUIRES
FOREIGN SUPPORT OR WITH FOREIGN SOME CHANGE RADICAL DE-
COMMITMENT APPROACHES IN APPROACH PARTURE IN
TO DEFENSE APPROACH OR
NEW POLICY
3. SIMILARITY WITH INCORPO- INCORPO- REQUIRES
ONGOING PROJECT RATES MAJOR RATES SOME TERMINATION
ONGOING ELEMENTS OF OR REDUCTION
PROJECT ONGOING OF ONGOING
RDT&E PROJECT
4. LIKELIHOOD OF U. S. AND SIMILAR VERY





B. COSTS COULD MODERATE LITTLE
RADICALLY INFLUENCE IMPACT
REDUCE COST
C. TECHNOLOGY POTENTIAL POTENTIAL LITTLE
SHARING FOR SIGNIF- FOR MODERATE POTENTIAL
ICANT SAVINGS FOR SAVINGS
SAVINGS
D. SECURITY UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET; VERY































































































POTENTIAL TO RE- HIGH (9 PTS) MEDIUM (4 LOW (1 PT)
DRESS CONVENTIONAL RED PTS) YELLOW GREEN
FORCE DEFICIENCY
1. NEW CONVENTIONAL GIVES CAPA- REDRESSES PROVIDES
DEFENSE CAPABILITY BILITY TO LONG TERM INCREMENTAL
REDRESS IMBALANCE IMPROVEMENT
SHORT TERM IN NATO/
IMBALANCE ALLIED CAPA-
BILITY
2. MEETS U. S. SIGNED JCS REQUIREMENT NO FORMAL
OPERATIONAL AND SERVICE IN REVIEW REQUIREMENT
REQUIREMENT REQUIREMENT EXISTS
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POTENTIAL TO RE- HIGH (9 PTS) MEDIUM (4 LOW (1 PT)
DRESS CONVENTIONAL RED PTS ) YELLOW GREEN
FORCE DEFICIENCY
3. ADDRESSES FORMAL FORMALLY LINKED TO WEAK LINKAGE
NATO/ALLIED DEFI- APPROVED DEFICIENCIES TO FORMAL





PRIORITY WITHIN HIGH (9 PTS) MEDIUM (4 LOW (1 PT)
SERVICE/AGENCY RED PTS) YELLOW GREEN
1. LIKELIHOOD OF MEETS VERY MEETS MODER- GENERALLY
FOLLOW- ON HIGH PRIORI- ATE PRIORITY SUPPORTIVE
ACQUISITION TY SERVICE/ OBJECTIVE OF OBJEC-
AGENCY TIVES
OBJECTIVE
2. PLANNED COMMIT- SOLIDLY IN MODERATE NOT YET
MENT TO PROCUREMENT LONG TERM LEVEL OF INCORPORATED
PLANS LONG TERM IN LONG TERM
COMMITMENT PLANS
3 . WILLINGNESS TO SERVICE/ SERVICE/ SERVICE/
FUND "PRE-MOU" AGENCY WILL AGENCY WILL AGENCY WILL
COSTS COVER ALL COVER ONLY NOT COVER
SUCH COSTS PART OF
COSTS
SUCH COSTS
4. STATUS OF U. S. WELL — _ NEW
PROJECT ESTABLISHED
5. WILLINGNESS TO WILLING TO MAY COMMIT NOT WILLING
USE U. S. COMMIT KEY KEY TO COMMIT
FACILITIES FACILITIES FACILITIES KEY FACILI-
TIES
SUPPORT IN FIVE- HIGH (9 PTS) MEDIUM (4 LOW (1 PT)
YEAR DEFENSE PLAN RED PTS) YELLOW GREEN
1. SUPPORT IN CONTAINED IN COMMITMENT NO
SERVICE POM SERVICE POM TO PUT IN COMMITMENT
POM LATER YET
2. SUPPORT IN CONTAINED IN COMMITMENT NO





Though the OSD evaluation format did allow for a
quantitative comparison of one candidate program to another,
the IP Office decided not to adopt the OSD format because it
did not adequately consider the point of view of the foreign
participants in the MOU. Their experience with MOUs convinced
the IP Office that the key to the success of an MOU was the
"degree of convergence" between the U. S. decision factors and
the foreign decision factors; a high degree of convergence
indicated a synergism at work in the MOU that helped ensure a
successful program.
B. INITIAL SUCCESS CRITERIA EVALUATION
1. U. S. /Foreign Evaluation Criteria
On October 5, 1990, the IP Office developed the following








LEGISLATION MEMBER/STAFF NO INTEREST









II. PROGRAMMATIC 10 5 1
FACTORS
- PROGRAM MAJOR SYSTEM OTHER SYSTEM TECHBASE
OBJECTIVE FLEET FLEET AND/OR
DELIVERY DELIVERY STUDIES
-MILITARY APPROVED OR APPROVED TOR INTENT/ NO
REQUIREMENTS OR REQUIRED
-ALLIANCE APPROVED APPROVED INTENT TO
REQUIREMENTS NATO OUTLINE NATO MISSION DEVELOP
STAFF TARGET NEED
EVALUATION
-MOU/PROGRAM NO MOU/ CONSTRAINED MAJOR
SCHEDULES PROGRAM MOU/PROGRAM SCHEDULE
SCHEDULE SCHEDULES DISCONNECT
PROBLEMS
-INDUSTRIAL BASE ENHANCES NO IMPACT ON NEGATIVE
IMPACT U. S. U. S. U. S.
INDUSTRIAL INDUSTRIAL INDUSTRIAL
BASE BASE BASE IMPACT

















































-SECURITY LOW RISK MEDIUM RISK HIGH RISK
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2. Five-step Evaluation Method
Using the above criteria, the IP office conducted the
following five- step evaluation process on each Project
Nomination Proposal:
• Establish initial U. S. "Strength Rating" based on
evaluation of proposed program vis-a-vis IP "program
success" indicators.
• Analyze Foreign Intentions/Capabilities in a similar
manner.
• Compare results of the first two steps to "match up" U.
S. /Foreign strengths/weaknesses. Since U. S. and foreign
factors can either support, neutralize, or conflict with
each other, the initial U. S. "Strength Rating" may be
positively or negatively affected by the degree of
convergence between the U. S. and Foreign intentions and
capabilities
.
• Qualitatively determine the proposed program's
"Probability of Success" and "Payoff Potential" if program
is successful.
• Develop a consolidated priority listing which takes into
account the program's quantitative "Composite Strength
Rating, " and qualitative "Probability of Success" and
"Payoff Potential" assessments.
The individual criteria for each area (Level of
Commitment, Programmatic Factors, Ability to Contribute) were
assigned values from one to ten; an average for each area was
then determined and multiplied by a predetermined weight
(0.75, 1.5, and 1.0 for Level of Commitment, Programmatic
Factors, and Ability to Contribute, respectively) to arrive at
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an area "Strength Rating." Area strength ratings for both the
United States and the foreign participants were compared,
summed and multiplied by a second weight to arrive at a
composite area strength rating. This second weight (ranging
in multiples of 0.25 from 0.50 to 1.50) was subjectively-
determined by the IP Office by aligning the individual
criteria under each U. S. area with their foreign
counterparts. If a positive degree of convergence existed for
an area, the weight would be a value greater than one. A
value of one was assigned for a neutral degree of convergence,
and a value less than one was assigned for a negative degree
of convergence. These composite area strength ratings were
then summed to determine the final composite value by which
programs would be ranked.
3. Initial Application Of Evaluation Criteria and Method
a. Programs Evaluated
The following programs were initially evaluated; the short
titles in parentheses are for cross-referencing purposes:
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The individual evaluation sheets for the above programs
are recreated on the following six pages. Although the format
of these recreations differs slightly from the originals due
to software limitations, the data and general sense of the
evaluations remain true to the originals.
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PROGRAM SHORT TITLE; NMMS
UNITED STATES















Degree of Convergence Weight: 1.0
Programmatic Factors (1.5)
-Program Objective 4
-Military Reqm' ts 10



















Degree of Convergence Weight: 1.25



























Degree of Convergence Weight: 1.5
U. S. Strength 22.25 Foreign Strength





PROGRAM SHORT TITLE: ASMCM
UNITED STATES FOREIGN






































-3rd Party Sales NA
Objectives
-Strength Rating 10.13
Degree of Convergence Weight: 1.25




















Degree of Convergence Weight: 1.5
U. S. Strength 21.33 Foreign Strength





PROGRAM SHORT TITLE; SPIN
UNITED STATES FOREIGN


















Degree of Convergence Weight: 1.0
Programmatic Factors (1.5
-Program Objective 6





















-3rd Party Sales NA
Objectives
-Strength Rating 11.25




















Degree of Convergence Weight: 1.25
U. S. Strength 21.75 Foreign Strength





PROGRAM SHORT TITLE: CIP
UNITED STATES



































-3rd Party Sales NA
Objectives
-Strength Rating 10.50
Degree of Convergence Weight: 1.25



















Degree of Convergence Weight: 1.0
U. S. Strength 21.50 Foreign Strength





PROGRAM SHORT TITLE; CSNI
UNITED STATES FOREIGN


















Degree of Convergence Weight: 1.0








-3rd Party Sales NA
Objectives
-Strength Rating 7.80
Degree of Convergence Weight: 1.25





























Degree of Convergence Weight: 1.25
U. S. Strength 19.38 Foreign Strength





PROGRAM SHORT TITLE: C2P2
UNITED STATES



































-3rd Party Sales NA
Objectives
-Strength Rating 6.75
Degree of Convergence Weight: 1.0




















Degree of Convergence Weight: 1.25
U. S. Strength 15.25 Foreign Strength





c. Results of Initial Application



















NMMS 58.53 22.25 22.35 MEDIUM-
HIGH
HIGH
ASMCM 54.91 21.33 20.38 HIGH HIGH
SPIN 54.00 21.75 22 .75 MEDIUM-
HIGH
HIGH




CSNI 48.48 19.38 20.70 MEDIUM-
HIGH
MEDIUM
C2P2 35.94 15.25 17.10 MEDIUM MEDIUM-
HIGH
4. Second Application of Evaluation Criteria and Method
a. Programs Evaluated
An additional 12 programs were evaluated later in the same
fiscal year. These programs are listed below:
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PROGRAM TITLE FOREIGN PARTICIPANTS












































The following pages replicate the evaluation sheets
resulting from this second application of the success criteria
and 5 -step evaluation method to candidate programs:
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PROGRAM SHORT TITLE; RSU
UNITED STATES FOREIGN


















Degree of Convergence Weight: 1.0








-3rd Party Sales NA
Objectives
-Strength Rating 9.60
Degree of Convergence Weight: 1.25






























Degree of Convergence Weight: 1.25
U. S. Strength 21.10 Foreign Strength
Probability of Success: Medium-High
Payoff Potential: Medium-High
COMPOSITE STRENGTH 51.2 5
20.90
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PROGRAM SHORT TITLE; AES
UNITED STATES





































































Degree of Convergence Weight: 1.25
U. S. Strength 18.25 Foreign Strength











PROGRAM SHORT TITLE; TLSS
UNITED STATES







































-3rd Party Sales NA
Objectives
-Strength Rating 8.70




















Degree of Convergence Weight: 1.25
U. S. Strength 18.10 Foreign Strength





PROGRAM SHORT TITLE; TTS
UNITED STATES















Degree of Convergence Weight: 1.0
Programmatic Factors (1.5) Programmatic Factors (1.5)
-Program Objective 5 -Program Objective 5
-Military Reqm' ts 2 -Military Reqm'ts 2
-Alliance Reqm' ts 7 -Alliance Reqm'ts 7
-MOU/ Program 8 -MOU/Program 8
Schedules Schedules
-Industrial Base 6 -Industrial Base 6
Impact Impact
-3rd Party Sales NA -3rd Party Sales NA
Objectives Objectives
-Strength Rating 8.40 -Strength Rating 8. 40
Degree of Converg*Bnce Weight: 1.25
Ability to Contribut:e (1.0) Ability to Contribute (1. 0)
-Funding 1 -Funding 1
-Government 10 -Government 10
Technology Technology
- Industry 10 - Industry 10
Technology Technology
-Technology 5 -Technology 5
Transfer Transfer
-Security NA -Security 10
-Strength Rating 6.50 -Strength Rating 7. 20
Degree of Convergence Weight: 1.25
U. S. Strength 16.65 Foreign Strength





PROGRAM SHORT TITLE; DTS
UNITED STATES



































-3rd Party Sales NA
Objectives
-Strength Rating 9.00
Degree of Convergence Weight: 1.00




















Degree of Convergence Weight: 1.00
U. S. Strength 17.75 Foreign Strength





PROGRAM SHORT TITLE; TSS
UNITED STATES















Degree of Convergence Weight: 1.0








-3rd Party Sales NA
Objectives
-Strength Rating 9.00
Degree of Convergence Weight: 1.00






























Degree of Convergence Weight: 0.75
U. S. Strength 18.50 Foreign Strength





PROGRAM SHORT TITLE: PC -J
UNITED STATES



































-3rd Party Sales NA
Objectives
-Strength Rating 7.50
Degree of Convergence Weight: 1.00




















Degree of Convergence Weight: 1.00
U. S. Strength 16.25 Foreign Strength





PROGRAM SHORT TITLE: OC-N
UNITED STATES















Degree of Convergence Weight: 1.0








-3rd Party Sales NA
Objectives
-Strength Rating 7.50
Degree of Convergence Weight: 1.00






























Degree of Convergence Weight: 1.00
U. S. Strength 16.25 Foreign Strength
Probability of Success: Medium
Payoff Potential: Medium
COMPOSITE STRENGTH 32.2 5
16.00
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PROGRAM SHORT TITLE: OCA-G
UNITED STATES FOREIGN









































-3rd Party Sales NA
Objectives
-Strength Rating 6.00




















Degree of Convergence Weight: 1.00
U. S. Strength 16.17 Foreign Strength





PROGRAM SHORT TITLE: OCA-M
UNITED STATES







































-3rd Party Sales NA
Objectives
-Strength Rating 6.00




















Degree of Convergence Weight: 1.00
U. S. Strength 16.17 Foreign Strength





PROGRAM SHORT TITLE; MWSS
UNITED STATES















Degree of Convergence Weight: 1.0








-3rd Party Sales NA
Objectives
-Strength Rating 8.63
Degree of Convergence Weight: 1.00
Ability to Contribute (1.0) Ability to Contribute





























Degree of Convergence Weight: 1.00
U. S. Strength 16.38 Foreign Strength





PROGRAM SHORT TITLE: RSR
UNITED STATES



































-3rd Party Sales NA
Objectives
-Strength Rating 6.38
Degree of Convergence Weight: 1.00




















Degree of Convergence Weight: 1.00
U. S. Strength 12.88 Foreign Strength





c. Results of Second Application























AES 45.31 18.25 18.65 MEDIUM-
HIGH
MEDIUM




TTS 41.63 16.65 17.35 MEDIUM-
HIGH
MEDIUM
DTS 36.10 17.75 18.35 MEDIUM MEDIUM
TSS 33.16 18.50 18.55 MEDIUM MEDIUM-
LOW
OC-J 32.25 16.25 16.00 MEDIUM MEDIUM
OC-N 32.25 16.25 16.00 MEDIUM MEDIUM
OCA-G 31.67 16.17 15.50 MEDIUM MEDIUM-
LOW
OCA-M 31.67 16.17 15.50 MEDIUM MEDIUM-
LOW
MWSS 31.43 16.38 15.05 MEDIUM MEDIUM-
LOW
RSR 27.00 12.88 14. 13 MEDIUM MEDIUM-
LOW
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C. REVISED SUCCESS CRITERIA EVALUATION
1. Revised U. S. /Foreign Evaluation Criteria
On July 30, 1991, the IP office revised the evaluation
criteria. The revision separated two criteria ("Technology
Transfer" and "Security") from the "Ability to Contribute"
area and established them in a new area, "Technology/Security
Factors." Under the "Programmatic Factors" area, the revision
deleted one criterion ("Alliance Requirements"), replaced two
criteria ("Industrial Base Impact" and "3rd Party Sales
Objectives") with new ones ("Workshare" and "Payoff"), and
added NATO operational requirements criteria to the "Military







LEGISLATION MEMBER/STAFF NO INTEREST









II. PROGRAMMATIC 10 5 1
FACTORS
- PROGRAM MAJOR SYSTEM OTHER SYSTEM TECHBASE/
OBJECTIVE FLEET FLEET STUDIES
DELIVERY DELIVERY
-MILITARY APPROVED APPROVED INTENT/NO
REQUIREMENTS OR/NSR TOR/NST OR REQUIRED
-MOU/PROGRAM NO MOU/ CONSTRAINED MAJOR
SCHEDULES PROGRAM MOU/PROGRAM SCHEDULE
SCHEDULE SCHEDULE DISCONNECT
PROBLEMS
-WORKSHARE WORKSHARE WORKSHARE WORKSHARE
EQUALS W/IN PLUS OR DOES NOT
COSTSHARE MINUS 10% OF EQUAL
COSTSHARE COSTSHARE












































The evaluation process associated with this new set of
criteria differs from the initial process. The weights (0.75,
1.50, and 1.00) of the initial process are again assigned to
the areas of "Level of Commitment," "Programmatic Factors,"
and "Ability to Contribute," and a weight of 1.00 is assigned
to the new area "Technology/Security Factors." U. S. and
foreign strength ratings are computed as before, but the
composite strength rating computation differs. Under the
initial process, each area's strength ratings (U. S. and
foreign) were first summed and then multiplied by subjectively
assigned weights; the resultant products were then summed to
arrive at the composite strength rating. Under the revised
procedure, all area strength ratings (both U. S. and foreign)
are summed and multiplied by a single, subjectively assigned
weight factor. Summary U. S. and foreign strength ratings are
not computed under the revised process; neither are
qualitative measures given to "Probability of Success" or
"Payoff Potential."
3. Application of Revised Evaluation Criteria and Method
a. Programs Evaluated
Four programs were evaluated using the revised criteria























The evaluation sheets representing these four programs are
reproduced on the following pages:
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PROGRAM SHORT TITLE: MUAV
UNITED STATES















































OVERALL STRENGTH MATCHING 1.00
COMPOSITE STRENGTH 62.73
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PROGRAM SHORT TITLE; ADV ST
UNITED STATES















































OVERALL STRENGTH MATCHING 1.2 5
COMPOSITE STRENGTH 58.00
74
PROGRAM SHORT TITLE; AL BAT
UNITED STATES













Ability to Contribute (1.0)
FOREIGN




































OVERALL STRENGTH MATCHING 1.00
COMPOSITE STRENGTH 55.3 8
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PROGRAM SHORT TITLE: RAIDS
UNITED STATES





















































OVERALL STRENGTH MATCHING 1.00
COMPOSITE STRENGTH 39.25
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c. Re -evaluation of Programs Using Revised Evaluation
Criteria and Method
Attempting to standardize the evaluation process, the IP
office re-evaluated the six programs initially evaluated
(NMMS, ASMCM, SPIN, CIP, CSNI , and C2P2) using the new
criteria and procedures. These re -evaluations are reproduced
on the following pages:
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PROGRAM SHORT TITLE: NMMS
UNITED STATES FOREIGN














































OVERALL STRENGTH MATCHING 1.5
COMPOSITE STRENGTH 7 5.20
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PROGRAM SHORT TITLE; ASMCM
UNITED STATES













Ability to Contribute (1.0)
FOREIGN
































OVERALL STRENGTH MATCHING 1.50
COMPOSITE STRENGTH 65.95
79
PROGRAM SHORT TITLE; SPIN
UNITED STATES




















































OVERALL STRENGTH MATCHING 1.25
COMPOSITE STRENGTH 68.50
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PROGRAM SHORT TITLE; CIP
UNITED STATES















































OVERALL STRENGTH MATCHING 1.0
COMPOSITE STRENGTH 62.10
PROGRAM SHORT TITLE; CSNI
UNITED STATES























































OVERALL STRENGTH MATCHING 1.2 5
COMPOSITE STRENGTH 62.38
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PROGRAM SHORT TITLE: C2P2
UNITED STATES


























































OVERALL STRENGTH MATCHING 1.25
COMPOSITE STRENGTH 52.15
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d. Results of Application of Revised Criteria and
Method
The results of the evaluation conducted using the revised
criteria and method are summarized in the table below,










NMMS 58.53 1 75.20 1
SPIN 54.00 3 68.50 2
ASMCM 54.91 2 65.95 3
MUAV NA NA 62.73 4
CSNI 48.48 5 62.38 5
CIP 50.50 4 62.10 6
ADV ST NA NA 58.00 7
AL BAT NA NA 55.38 8
C2P2 35.94 6 52.15 9
RAIDS NA NA 39.25 10
D. ANOMALIES RESULTING FROM APPLICATION OF REVISED CRITERIA
AND METHOD
Several anomalies are readily apparent regarding the two
evaluation procedures. Of primary significance is the fact
that the four programs being evaluated for the first time
generally scored lower than those programs being re- evaluated
using the revised procedures. Additionally, for two pairs
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(ASMCM/SPIN and CIP/CSNI) , the revised rankings are the
reverse of the initial rankings. These anomalies caused the
IP office to question whether there might be problems with the
revised procedure; evaluations using the revised procedure
were halted until a review could be conducted.
85
IV: ANALYSIS OF DATA
A. SPREADSHEET ANALYSIS OF INITIAL EVALUATION CRITERIA AND
METHOD
1. Construction of Spreadsheet
To analyze the IPO evaluation process required translating
the data from the various sets of evaluation sheets into a
spreadsheet program that replicated both the appearance and
the functions of the evaluation sheet. The cell contents of



















































@SUM(C8. .CIO) /@COUNT(C8. .CIO) *B11
STRENGTH RATING
@SUM(G8. .G10) /@COUNT(G8. .G10) *F11
PROGRAMMATIC FACTORS
86
E14 : PROGRAMMATIC FACTORS
A16 : PROGRAM OBJECTIVES
C16 4
E16 : PROGRAM OBJECTIVES
G16 4
A17 : MILITARY RQMTS
C17 . 10










A2 0. INDUST BASE IMPACT
C2 0. 5
E20. INDUST BASE IMPACT
G2 5
A21. THIRD PARTY SALES
C21: 5






A2 3. STRENGTH RATING
C23: @SUM(C16. .C21) /@COUNT(C16. .C21) *B22
E23: STRENGTH RATING
G23: @SUM(G16. .G21) /©COUNT (G16. .G21) *F22
A2 5 ABILITY TO CONTRIBUTE




G2 7 : 10
A2 8 GOVT TECHNOLOGY
C2 8 : 10
E28 : GOVT TECHNOLOGY
G2 8 : 10
A2 9 : INDUST TECHNOLOGY
C29 : 8
E29 : INDUST TECHNOLOGY
G29 : 8
A3 : TECH TRANSFER
C30 : 10















































@SUM(C27. .C31)/@COUNT(C2 7. .C31) *B32
STRENGTH RATING


























While creating the spreadsheet, it was discovered that,
for any line item on the evaluation sheet not given a
numerical score (i.e. "Security" under the United States'
"Ability to Contribute"), the corresponding cell on the
spreadsheet (C31) had to be completely blank. Any entry (i.
e. NA, 0, or even a global justification command) in such a
cell would be counted as an entry in the subsequent "@COUNT"
88
formula used to compute the area strength rating (in this
instance cell C33) and would result in an incorrect
calculation.
2. Results of Spreadsheet Analysis
The key formula cells of this spreadsheet (C12, G12 , C23,
G23, C33, G33, C35, G35, and H47) duplicated the values of the
area strength ratings, the total strength ratings, and the
composite strength rating of the evaluation sheet. The values
represented by the other formula cells (D43, H43, D44, H44,
D45, H45) do not appear on the evaluation sheet but were
included in the spreadsheet for ease of computation.
This spreadsheet analysis was applied to the evaluation
sheets representing the initial evaluation performed on the
following candidate programs:
• NATO Mechanical Minesweeping System
• Anti-Ship Missile Countermeasure
• "Spinnaker"
• U. S. PACOM Combined Interoperability Program
• NATO CSNI
• Continuous Processing of Solid Propellants
• Remote Sensing Unit with Synthetic Aperture Radar
• Airborne Electromagnetic Sensor
• Tactical Lightweight Surveillance Satellite
• Tactical Target Support
• Distributed Tactical Surveillance
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• Tactical Ship Surveillance
• Oceanography Cooperation- -Japan
• Oceanography Cooperation- -Norway
• Ocean Color Assessment (G-I-N Sea)
• Ocean Color Assessment (Mediterranean Sea)
• Millimeter Wave Sea Surveillance
• Remote Spectrometry Research.
In every instance, the spreadsheet analysis of these programs
directly correlated to all values on the evaluation sheets.
B. SPREADSHEET ANALYSIS OF REVISED EVALUATION CRITERIA AND
METHOD
1. Construction of Spreadsheet
A second, similar spreadsheet based on the evaluation
sheets of the revised evaluation criteria and procedures was
then created; the criteria scores and weights of the Maritime
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (MUAV) evaluation sheet were used in
creating the spreadsheet. The following represents the cell




































C12: @SUM(C8. .CIO) /@COUNT(C8. .CIO) *B11
E12: STRENGTH RATING











A18: MOU/ PROGRAM SKED
CI 8: 10















C22: @SUM(C16. .C20) /@COUNT(C16. .C20) *B21
E22: STRENGTH RATING
G22: @SUM(G16. .G20) /@COUNT(G16. .G20) *F21
A24: ABILITY TO CONTRIBUTE



















































@SUM(C26. -C27) /0COUNT (C26. .C27) *B28
STRENGTH RATING
@SUM(G26. .G27) /@COUNT (G26. .G27) *F28















@SUM(C33. .C34) /0COUNT (C33. .C34) *B35
STRENGTH RATING
@SUM(G33. -G34) /@COUNT (G33. -G34) *F35
TOTAL COMBINED STRENGTH






. Results of Spreadsheet Analysis
With this spreadsheet, the formula cells corresponding to
the area strength ratings (C12, G12, C22, G22, C29, G29, C36
and G36) produced values identical with the values on the
evaluation sheet. The composite strength formula cell (D43)
,
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however, produced a value different from the evaluation sheet
(97.80 vice 75.20) . This second spreadsheet was applied to
all the programs that had undergone the revised evaluation
procedure, using the criteria scores and weights from the
evaluation sheets. Always, the results were the same: area
strength ratings corresponded to the evaluation sheets but
composite strength ratings differed. The following table






















NMMS 97.80 1 75.20 1
ASMCM 86.18 2 65.95 3
SPIN 80.00 3 68.50 2
CSNI 72.50 4 62.38 5
ADV ST 67. 66 5 58.00 7
MUAV 62.73 6 62.73 4
CIP 62.10 7 62.10 6
C2P2 60.50 8 52.15 9
AL BAT 55.38 9 55.38 8
RAIDS 39.25 10 39.25 10
93
Since the spreadsheet calculations corresponded to the
evaluation sheets in all area strength ratings, and differed
in all composite strength ratings, the cell governing the
computation of "Composite Strength" was examined further.
C. REASON FOR DISCREPANCY BETWEEN EVALUATION SHEETS AND
SPREADSHEET ANALYSIS
The "Composite Strength" value on the evaluation sheet was
being calculated in a manner different from the intent of the
evaluation sheet. Referring back to the MUAV spreadsheet
analysis, "Composite Strength" is calculated by the formula
"+D40*D41" or, substituting in for cell D40, by the formula
"+ (C12+G12+C22+G22+C29+G29+C36+G36) *D41.
"
This formula captures the intent of the revised procedure: to
apply a single "Strength Matching" weight (D41) to the sum of
all the area strength ratings.
The IPO evaluation sheets, however, calculate "Composite
Strength" using the formula
"+C12+G12+C22+G22+C36+G36+ ( (C29+G29) *D41) .
"
This formula isolates and sums the "Ability to Contribute"
area strength ratings, applies the "Strength Matching" weight
to that sum, and then adds in the remaining area strength
ratings. By doing so, the formula is responsible for the
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downward skewing noticed by the IP Office when they first
applied the revised evaluation criteria.
D. APPLYING THE SPREADSHEET CALCULATIONS TO THOSE CANDIDATE
PROGRAMS NEVER EVALUATED WITH REVISED CRITERIA AND METHOD
The spreadsheet program representing the intent of the
revised criteria and procedure was then applied to the twelve
programs never re- evaluated with the revised criteria.
Criteria scores for the two line items ("Workshare" and
"Payoff") not on the initial evaluation sheet had to be
developed. For "Workshare, " a value equivalent to the score
given to "Industrial Base Impact" on the initial evaluation
was used. For "Payoff," the subjectively determined "Payoff
Potential" from the initial evaluation was translated into a
numerical score between one and ten and used in the
spreadsheet. The "Degree of Convergence" weight assigned to
the "Ability to Contribute" area on the initial evaluation was
used as the "Strength Matching" weight of the spreadsheet.
The "Workshare" and "Strength Matching" assignments were done
after consulting with Mr. Frank Kenlon of the IP Office; the
"Payoff" assignment represents a natural progression from one






















E. FINAL PRIORITY RANKING OF ALL 22 CANDIDATE PROGRAMS
The following table represents the final ranking of the 22
programs based on the composite strength ratings calculated by
the spreadsheet; included is a column with the current status








NMMS 97.80 SIGNED MOU
ASMCM 86.18 AWAITING START
OF NEGOTIATIONS











CSNI 72.50 SIGNED MOU
AES 69.06 PROPOSAL
WITHDRAWN
ADV ST 67.66 DEVELOPING RAN
MUAV 62.73 DEVELOPING RAN
CIP 62.10 AWAITING START
OF NEGOTIATIONS
C2P2 60.50 DEVELOPING RAN
TLSS 58.63 PROPOSAL
WITHDRAWN






















With the spreadsheet evaluation, it appears that a
composite strength score of 55 or above represents a
threshold; all programs that did not reach that threshold
resulted in the candidate program being withdrawn from
consideration. Two programs (RSU and AES) that exceeded the
threshold also had their proposals withdrawn; to correlate
their withdrawal to their evaluation scores, statistical
analysis techniques were applied to the spreadsheet evaluation
scores
.
F. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF SPREADSHEET EVALUATION SCORES
Based on the status of each of the 22 programs, the
programs were assigned to one of two groups, Unsuccessful or
Successful, to perform a statistical analysis of the
spreadsheet evaluation scores. The Unsuccessful group
consisted of those programs with a status indicating that the
proposal had been withdrawn; the Successful group consisted of
all others.
Combined (U. S. and Foreign) median and sample mean scores
for each of the four evaluation areas of the spreadsheet
(Level of Commitment, Programmatic Factors, Ability to
Contribute, and Technology/Security) were calculated for each
group; the standard distribution of the mean was also


















































Of all the median and sample means calculated, the most
statistically significant, in terms of the range of score
disparity between the Unsuccessful and Successful groups, are
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the sample mean scores of the Level of Commitment area.
Combined median, sample means, and standard distributions were
calculated for each line item in the Level of Commitment area;




































Statistically, the most significant of these line item
scores are the median and sample mean values of the combined
OSD/MOD line item scores. Without OSD/MOD support, a proposal
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appears doomed; with OSD/MOD support, a proposal's weaknesses
in other areas may be surmounted.
G. CORRELATION OF IPO'S EVALUATION CRITERIA WITH OSD SUCCESS
INDICATORS
At a Four Powers (United States, United Kingdom, France,
Germany) Conference held in Monterey, California on October 5,
1991, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for International
Programs (DUSD(IP)) briefed the participants on OSD's
viewpoint regarding the criteria of success for cooperative
programs; the OSD criteria are presented below:
• A common, well defined requirement;
• An early start supported by technology cooperation and
venture capital from Nunn amendment funding;
• A clear view ahead on life-cycle funding;
• A clear view of competitive programs;
• Equal priority for each player;
• Two or three partners maximum;
• Each partner bringing something to the program besides
money
;
• The will to see it through, including a mutual
understanding of cultures, concurrence on acquisition
strategy, strong program managers, and support at the
highest level.
The policy, procedures and criteria implemented by IPO
through the evaluation of candidate programs generally
supports the OSD success criteria. One instance of divergence
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pertains to the number of partners being considered for a
program; IPO does not take into account a candidate program
having more than three partners while conducting its
evaluation. Unless it has significant OSD/MOD support, a
program with an excessive number of partners may experience
difficulties obtaining the authority to negotiate an
international agreement.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
The examination of the evaluation performed by the Navy
International Programs Office on 22 candidate program
proposals led to the following conclusions:
• Upon revising the success criteria, a miscommunication
resulted in evaluations being conducted in such a manner
that overemphasized the "Ability to Contribute" area of
the criteria and that produced inaccurate "Composite
Strength" scores and ranking.
• The single, evaluation criteria line item that principally
determines whether a candidate program gains approval to
develop the Request Authority to Negotiate document is the
level of OSD/MOD support of the program; by extension, the
single principal evaluation area is the "Level of
Commi tment " area
.
• The International Programs Office's policy, procedures,
and evaluation criteria are in general agreement with
their OSD counterparts; however, the International
Programs Office does not penalize a candidate program for
having an excessive number of partners.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
The recommendations derived from the above conclusions are
as follows:
• The International Programs Office should correct the
software programming error that produces the evaluation
anomalies; this should be accomplished by implementing the
spreadsheet "Composite Strength" formula in Section IV-
C
of this thesis.
• The International Programs Office should direct its
resources at those candidate programs with a composite
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strength score of 55 or above, and at all candidate
programs with a combined OSD/MOD line item score of three
or above
.
• The International Programs Office should subtract points
from the composite strength scores of those candidate
programs with an excessive number of partners before
ranking to reflect the greater risk of the program.
• The International Programs Office should continue to
critique the criteria and procedures used to evaluate
candidate programs to stay current with the rapidly-
changing environment of the international arena.
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